

COST EFFECTIVE TRAINING FOR
NAVY SENIOR PETTY OFFICERS.

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

COST EFFECTIVE TRAINING
FOR NAVY SENIOR PETTY OFFICERS

by

Francis K. Holian

December 1977

Thesis Advisor: Raymond L. Forbes Jr.

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by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
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ABSTRACT

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I. INTRODUCTION

"Every command and every major office and bureau of the Navy Department shall, on a continuing basis, review its leadership standards; each shall take effective measures to improve them and shall develop an awareness of the need for good leadership by providing programs of instruction in leadership principles and practices."

The above quotation is taken from Navy Department General Order Number Twenty-one. This General order goes on to specify that in accordance with article 0710 of Navy Regulations, 1948, "the Commanding Officer shall encourage and provide assistance and facilities to the personnel under his command who seek to further their education in professional and other subjects." In compliance with these orders the Navy has become one of the largest educational institutions in the world. From highly specialized schools such as Basic Underwater Demolition to graduate schools providing degrees in Nuclear Physics, the Navy has through the years developed comprehensive training programs to better prepare its people to do their jobs.

Since the establishment of the Navy's senior enlisted grades, E-8 and E-9, there have been numerous studies, surveys and investigative boards formed to determine the most effective administration, utilization and training of these groups. Despite these numerous attempts and after almost twenty years of existence, the Navy is still debating how these pay grades are to be best utilized and what training is required to better prepare them for their assigned duties.

A. OBJECTIVE

The objectives of this thesis are (1) to explore the utilization of these enlisted pay grades, E-8 and E-9, both as intended and in practice, (2) to identify what training is needed for these groups, and (3) to analyze alternative methods of providing this training. During this last phase the primary objective will be to determine which alternative would be the most cost effective given a recommended set of measurement criteria.

The need for this thesis was prompted by the results of the Chief of Naval Operations Master Chief Petty Officer Advisory Panel of October 1976, which recommended in part that the Navy should establish a Chief Petty Officer Academy that would provide the Navy's enlisted middle managers the requisite leadership skills required to properly manage and avoid "crisis management" situations. [1] Although the panel's recommendation limited its remarks to leadership skills, exploratory discussions with personnel in the office of the Master Chief Petty Officer of the Navy have indicated that the panel's envisioned CPO Academy would actually address a wide range of training needs for Navy middle managers. For purposes of this study the term "middle manager" will apply only to enlisted pay grades E-8 and E-9; the pay grade E-7 will be defined as the senior technician within a rating.

B. METHCDOLOGY

To accomplish the objectives of this thesis an in depth historical research of the Navy's Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer program was conducted from its inception to the present. The reports of the numerous study groups convened by the Chief of Naval Personnel provided the majority of the information concerning the utilization of these pay grades.

Also included in this research was a look at the Navy's original CPO Academy with its basic program, problems and reasons for failure. A survey of current efforts was then undertaken to determine the present status of the Navy's senior petty officer training programs, the comparable efforts of the other military services and lastly a sampling of programs from civilian industries. The primary emphasis in this phase of the study was to determine what it is that Master-Senior chief petty officers, ie middle managers, are supposed to do and what type of training is needed to help them do it better. Using the results and conclusions of this research a basic training program was then developed with specific criteria established by which alternative methods of providing this training could be judged. An economic, cost-effective analysis was then conducted to determine how best to employ the Navy's scarce training funds and resources to achieve its objectives. Inherent in this analysis was the need to look at all the costs and benefits of the alternatives, both those for which a dollar value could be assigned and those which by their nature must remain subjective. Lastly, based on the information presented, conclusions are drawn and some recommendations for future research are presented.

C. LIMITATIONS

Limitations have been imposed on this study by the resources and time available. In particular, information obtained was limited to that provided by various offices in the Bureau of Naval Personnel and Chief of Naval Education and Training, and to that available in the Naval Post Graduate School library with its associated computer research facilities. Due to the nature of the problem investigated, relatively little written historical information was uncovered and, therefore, primary research

efforts were dedicated to telephone interviews of other Naval personnel involved in similar projects, to personal correspondence with several West Coast colleges, and to short field trips to the Army's Sergeants Major Academy and local industry in the Monterey area. Cost data from the civilian colleges was provided based on informal liaison and should not be considered as a firm commitment for a Navy program. Actual program cost data would require defining specific courses to be provided as well as identifying the specific institutions where the training would be accomplished. Such effort was beyond the scope of this study and until specific, formal Navy proposals are presented to these institutions it would be impossible to determine the exact costs involved. Recognizing these limitations, the estimates provided present reasonable approximations of the cost differences. Lastly, this study was limited to investigation of the Navy's Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer utilization and training and no attempt was made to evaluate this program against the Warrant Officer or Limited Duty Officer programs.

II. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY

The origin of the Navy's Senior and Master Chief Petty Officer roles can be traced back to May 20, 1958, when President Eisenhower signed Public Law 85-422. This legislation was a pay bill which authorized two new enlisted grades, E-8 and E-9, for all military services. The need for this law was initially recognized by the US Air Force. The Air Force was at that time experiencing retention problems with first term airmen due to the lack of promotion opportunity. This lack of opportunity was caused by the Korean War build up of senior petty officers. [2] This problem was further complicated by the fact that, since 1954, the Air Force had been using warrant officers to fill many company grade officer billets. The intent of the Air Force was to fill these billets with young college graduates with greater growth potential. Public Law 85-422 resolved the Air Force billet problems by creating vacancies in the enlisted ranks thereby enhancing promotion opportunities. The subsequent phasing out of the Air Force Warrant Officer program also made billets available for young college graduates. Another benefit Congress perceived from establishing the new pay grades was that all the military services would be able to retain the expertise of their senior enlisted personnel by providing an improved career pattern. [3] Although the law had established requirements for minimum years of service and for limitations on the number of personnel authorized per pay grade, it did not address how these new pay grades were to be utilized. Each service was, therefore, required to determine for themselves how they would employ their new senior enlisted personnel.

Preliminary Navy guidance was provided prior to the above congressional action in Bupers Notice 5321 of May 2,

1958. This notice was intended to alert major commands of the pending congressional action and to solicit their recommendations for prospective E-8 and E-9 billets. As specified in this notice, the new billets were to be identified from within the then existing E-7 structure. The billets selected, however, were to be those demanding outstanding leadership, administrative, and technical abilities. The notice further specified that the E-8 and E-9 billets were to be equitably representative of all ratings.

The general nature of this notice created confusion throughout the Navy in regard to what these new pay grades were actually supposed to do. As a result, there was no standardization between commands in identifying the E-8 and E-9 billets. Additionally, because of the requirement that all ratings were to be equitably represented, many billets were apparently identified simply to fill quotas and keep the number of rating billets the same. Despite subsequent attempts to rectify this situation, these problems persisted and have continued to plague this program. The following paragraphs are a brief summary of various study group attempts to correct the problems inherent in this program.

A. STUDY GROUPS

Following the establishment of the additional pay grades E-8 and E-9 in May 1958, the Chief of Naval Personnel periodically convened special study groups to examine the organization and administration of this program in conjunction with the Warrant Officer and Limited Duty Officer programs. In particular, these study groups were requested to provide recommendations with regard to maximizing the utilization of personnel assigned to these programs and to eliminate any redundancy of responsibilities.

1. Williams Board

In May of 1959, the Williams Board was formed to study the problems of the new E-8 - E-9 program and to conduct an overall evaluation of the effectiveness of the E-8 - E-9, Warrant Officer, and Limited Duty Officer programs. During their review the board determined that the majority of E-8 - E-9 billets were basically E-7 billets with no major change in status or responsibility. Additionally, the increased responsibility and technological expertise desired of E-8 - E-9's overlapped with that expected of Warrant Officers. Because of this problem and the combined effects of the Limited Duty Officer Program, the Warrant Officer program was determined to be no longer needed.

Based on the board's findings the major recommendations submitted were : (1) to eliminate the Warrant Officer program through attrition (the Air Force had already opted for this procedure); (2) to redesignate the warrant officer billets involved as either Limited Duty Officer or Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer billets as appropriate; (3) to require a minimum obligated service of at least two years upon advancement to either E-8 or E-9; and (4) to provide for coordinated detailing within the Bureau of Personnel for all three programs. The study group further suggested that the above recommendations should be placed in effect without substantial change for a trial period of five years. At the end of this trial period all aspects of the program were to be reevaluated under the conditions then existing. With the exception of providing for coordinated detailing, all recommendations were accepted and no new appointments to Warrant Officer were made during the trial period.

2. Settle Board

In August 1963, the Settle Board was convened under

the direction of Vadm Thomas G. W. Settle, USN, Retired. The board's purpose was to again study the utilization of personnel assigned to the three programs and to review the results of the Williams Board recommendations. Despite the subsequent guidance of Bupers Instruction 1430.11 of June 1958, and the envisioned billet redesignations recommended by the 1959 Williams Board, the Settle Board determined that the majority of Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer billets were still being assigned primarily to meet authorized manning ceilings. The board's report stated that rather than providing two higher enlisted pay grades with commensurate responsibility and authority, the Navy in fact was establishing two higher pay levels of chief petty officers, E-7. The board also determined that because of statutory limitations on their signature and accountability authority, Master-Senior chief petty officers were legally prohibited from assuming certain Warrant Officer billets. This finding was actually in error but the misconception was not corrected until November 1967.

In response to an inquiry from another study group convened at that time, the Judge Advocate General of the Navy stated that except for: (1) accounting for public funds; (2) administering the oath of enlistment or appointment; and (3) certifying documents for administrative purposes, there were no statutory restrictions on the assignment of Master-Senior Chief Petty Officers to ashore or afloat billets. [4] However, based on their original findings and the results of their review which supported the need for warrant officers to fill the technology gap caused by the increased sophistication of shipboard weapons systems, the Settle Board recommended that the Warrant Officer program be revitalized. To resolve the potential conflict of billet assignments the board further recommended that qualification requirements for Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer be formulated based upon the board's recommended compressed rating structure. Master-Senior

Chief Petty Officer billets could then be defined based on actual needs for these qualifications rather than to just fill authorized personnel ceilings.

As a result of this board's recommendations, the Warrant Officer program was restarted and an attempt was made to formally define the qualifications for Master-Senior Chief Petty Officer.

The compressed rating structure was a key element of this board's recommendations and it was based on the theory that a man should be required to have additional knowledge of other ratings as he goes up the rate-rank ladder. This increased knowledge would permit him to supervise more activities which would compliment the increased responsibility and authority envisioned by the original Bupers instruction. This increased supervisory role, however, was still defined as separate and subordinate to that of the Warrant Officer or Limited Duty Officer.

The Settle Board recognized that failure to define billets based on actual needs was the underlying cause of the Navy's problem in using the new enlisted pay grades. This last recommendation of defining billets based on actual needs, however, met with only marginal success.

3. Crutchfield Board

In June of 1967, the Crutchfield Board was convened. Unlike the previous two boards, this board was directed to limit the scope of its review to only the E-8 - E-9 program. In particular it was to study the role and function of E-8 - E-9 petty officers and the validity of the concept of rating compression as recommended by the Settle Board. It also was to make a thorough review of all previous recommendations and the adequacy of current instructions and notices. The emphasis of this review was to determine the effectiveness of this program in meeting the needs of the individual petty officers as well as the needs of the Navy.

Based on the results of their review, which included

surveys of all Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers, extensive field trips, and a detailed study of all previous correspondence, the board determined that the E-8 - E-9 program then in existence failed to meet either the needs of the individual petty officers or the Navy. The members determined that as of 1967 the Navy had still not officially established meaningful billet requirements nor adequate role and function definitions for E-8 - E-9's. As a result of these failures, the petty officers involved perceived a loss of recognition, prestige, and status which was adversely affecting their morale and retention. The Navy, in turn, was losing the services of this valuable group because of their early transfer to the fleet reserve. The Navy was also failing to effectively utilize their expertise while on active duty.

The board also determined that as a result of the self-cancelling provision of Bupers Notice 5321 of 25 November 1958, the Navy had not had official guidance concerning the utilization of Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers since April 1959. Lastly, the board determined that despite the intended goals of rating compression, this program was in fact contributing to the adverse perceptions of the E-8 - E-9's because the ratings compressed were not sufficiently similar and the petty officers were, therefore, not technically proficient in their new assignments. This lack of technical knowledge placed them in the embarrassing position of not being able to perform to their superiors' expectations nor properly supervise their subordinates.

To correct the problem of defining billet requirements and role and function definitions, the board proposed that two new categories of Master Chief Petty Officer be established and that the Senior Chief Petty Officer role be officially defined as the second highest technical or specialty supervisor for each general rating. The two categories of Master Chief Petty Officer would include one as the senior enlisted technical supervisor and

the second as an entirely new rating which would be defined as the enlisted assistant to the Commanding Officer or Command Assistant. Billet requirements were then proposed in terms of the above role and function definitions. The board also submitted revised notices and instructions and recommended that all rating compression be stopped.

Recognizing that the implementation of the prior two groups' recommendations had been a major problem, the board proposed that a single Bupers organization should be assigned the responsibility for implementation of all the recommendations. This organization would also be required to report periodically to higher authority on their progress. As an added check, the Inspector General's office was also to monitor the utilization of the senior petty officers during their routine inspections. Lastly, to properly prepare the Master Chief Petty Officers for their new duties, the board recommended that a formal school be established to provide training in the areas of administration, counseling, management-supervision, and communications.

Despite the efforts of this board and although many of its recommendations were approved in concept, the majority were never put into effect. No new role and function definitions nor revised billet qualifications and descriptions were ever published. The major successes of the board were limited to: (1) publicizing the signature authority of Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers; (2) stopping rating compression based solely on technical competence; and (3) although the new command assistant rating for Master Chief Petty Officer was not approved, the need for a billet such as Master Chief Petty Officer of the Command was established. No reasons were discovered for the Navy not carrying out the remainder of the board's recommendations.

4. CPO Academy

Another program that received varying amounts of attention during this same period of time (1959 to 1971) was the Chief Petty Officer Academy at Pensacola, Florida. The Chief Petty Officer Academy, or CPO Leadership School as it was originally designated, was authorized by the CNO on 25 February 1959, and became operational in April 1959. [5] It was originally conceived as an integral part of an overall Navy coordinated program to further leadership training in compliance with General Order Twenty-one. The Academy was operated under the direct cognizance of the Chief of Naval Air Training (CNATRA) through the Commanding Officer, Naval Aviation Schools Command. Its basic mission as stated in CNATRA Instruction 1510.7G of November 1969, was,

"To inculcate in selected Chief Petty Officers a more thorough awareness of their responsibilities through instruction in military matters, causes and effects of world tensions, and the principles and techniques of naval leadership."

The school's program consisted of five weeks of training for E-7's and above. Classes convened eight times a year with sixty students assigned per class for an annual through-put of four hundred and eighty students. Mandatory quotas were assigned by CNATRA to each command. The individual command was then responsible for funding all temporary additional duty expenses including travel to and from the school. Commanding Officers were enjoined to use their discretion in selecting only the best qualified candidates and those demonstrating the greatest potential for professional growth. The curriculum consisted of approximately two hundred hours of academic instruction with approximately fourteen percent of this time dedicated to management training. The remaining portion was devoted to drill and command, world affairs, Naval Traditions, Naval

Administration, and administrative time.

Throughout its twelve-year history, the concept of the CPO Academy was highly praised and the school was reported to be an unqualified success. However in 1971, while consideration was being given to establishing a second CPO Academy, this one on the west coast, the Chief of Naval Training reevaluated the existing academy. Based on the results of this study it was determined that continuation of the CPO Academy in its present form was not justified. This recommendation was based on what was described as "inherent problems" which plagued the school. Problems mentioned in the report were the use of the mandatory quota system, the questionable and inconsistent selection criteria between commands, and the curriculum emphasis on personal appearance and physical fitness. Additionally, there were complaints received from various commands regarding the disruptive nature of the five weeks of temporary additional duty on their operational readiness and the fiscal constraints imposed upon them by the requirement to fund the per diem and travel. The report went on to state that the value of the additional indoctrination and leadership-management training for chief petty officers was not questioned but in view of the above problems the school should be closed and no additional academy should be started.

It is interesting to note, however, that except for the reference to curriculum emphasis, the majority of problems mentioned related to the administration of the program. Recent researcher interviews with several Naval personnel who were familiar with the original CPO Academy substantiated the curriculum problem and stated in general their perception was that the academy had eroded to a "Boot Camp for Chiefs". The remaining problems, however, were external to the school organization and apparently would have persisted regardless of the quality of instruction.

5. Freeman Board

With the end of the Vietnam conflict and an increased interest in Human Resources management, the Chief of Naval Personnel in 1973, convened a new study group, the Freeman Board. The task of the board was to conduct a thorough examination of the entire enlisted rating structure. Special emphasis was to be directed at the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System (NEOCS) to determine the adequacy of this system to accurately identify the skills needed by the Navy over the next two decades. Recommendations were solicited from the board concerning which ratings required expansion, compression, deletion or redefining. The board was also to determine the appropriateness of the nine enlisted pay grades with the possibility of revising the structure to recognize technical-professional advancement without necessarily requiring a concomitant military advancement at each step.

During their review the board noted that the Navy Enlisted Occupational Classification System had not been reviewed nor updated since 1957 and that manpower and personnel management problems had arisen in the intervening years. In agreement with the Settle Board findings, the Freeman Board identified the introduction of sophisticated weapons systems as the main cause of the manpower problems which, in turn, placed demands on the enlisted rating structure for specialized skills that it was ill-equipped to handle.

The board determined that, with respect to the E-8 - E-9's, there continued to be problems with the overlap and duplication in duties and responsibilities between senior enlisted, Warrant Officers and Limited Duty Officers. In particular, the board noted the lack of consistency in defining E-8 - E-9 billets, the lack of sufficient E-8 - E-9 billets to provide a challenging career beyond twenty years of service, and lastly, the tendency to favor Warrant

Officers in "skill oriented" managerial positions. As a result of these problems the board reported that there was an apparent loss in prestige and status by the Navy's Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers which was adversely affecting their morale and retention.

To correct these problems the board recommended utilizing Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers in managerial capacities and eliminating a portion of the Warrant Officer structure for this purpose. It was believed that assigning Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers as managers would eliminate the previous problems of rating compression and allow for meaningful, challenging billets beyond the twenty year service point. The combined effect of this procedure would also provide for increased status and prestige to the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officer.

Many of the Freeman Board recommendations were implemented or are on-going at this time. However, due to the strong lobbying efforts of the Warrant Officer community, no attempt was made to redesignate any existing billets to Senior and Master Chief Petty Officer. Revised qualification and Navy Enlisted Classification (NEC) manuals were published but continued to describe the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officer only in terms of their rating or technical speciality.

B. CURRENT EFFORTS

Despite the progress that was made since the Freeman Board in the areas of personnel administration and management, the Navy has continued to be plagued with problems regarding the effective utilization of its Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers. From the preceding paragraphs it appears the basic problems have not changed. Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers still desire meaningful, challenging billets with increased authority and

responsibility. The leadership of the Navy desires to utilize the skills of its personnel in the most effective manner to fulfill the needs of the individual and accomplish the mission of the Navy. To accomplish these objectives a clear differentiation was needed between the senior enlisted rates.

Some progress was made in December 1974, when the role and function statements for Warrant Officer and Limited Duty Officer were approved by the Secretary of the Navy. (See Appendix A) Subsequent attempts at clarification for all grades of Chief Petty Officer were not as successful. Although Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers were defined in the Advancement Manual as specialty supervisors and administrators, meaningful billets different from those traditionally assigned to E-7's have not been provided.

In late 1975, another Ad Hoc Committee was formed to look into the CPO overlap problem but this committee did not produce any tangible results. A staff section of the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Pers 23, was then tasked by the Chief of Naval Personnel to evolve a larger role and greater prestige for the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers by recasting their occupational standards.

Pers 23 efforts to date have been tied closely to the Navy's Occupational Task Analysis Program (NOTAP). Using the results of the NOTAP studies, Pers 23 has developed new role and function definitions for all three grades of Chief Petty Officer. (See Appendix B) Their definitions are grounded in the recommendations of prior boards that Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers should be principally utilized as managers. Using this concept of E-8 and E-9's as managers, occupational standards for Chief Petty Officers and occupational scopes for Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have been developed. The difference between the two definitions lie in the requirement that to fulfill an occupational standard a person must be technically proficient in all lower rates. An occupational scope,

however, emphasizes management skills in which a person should be knowledgeable but not necessarily technically proficient in all skills of the lower ratings he supervises. Using this definitional difference Pers 23 has reclassified the approximately seventy technical ratings into twenty-four occupational fields. It is believed that this reclassification effort will provide a natural progression from senior in-rating technician to manager within the chief petty officer structure. This progression, in turn, should provide the larger role and greater prestige the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers desire. However, as the Pers 23 study points out, defining a man as a manager and ensuring he has the necessary background to perform as one are not exactly the same thing. This same thought was expressed earlier in a message from Commander Naval Air Forces, Pacific, promulgated in November 1974, which stated,

"In order to effectively manage men and material, to deal with the mindset of incoming personnel and to achieve the mission, leadership-management training is necessary. A need exists for this training at a priority level equal to technical training."

More recently the recommendation from the Chief of Naval Operations Master Chief Petty Officer Advisory Panel of October 1976, indicated that Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have also perceived a need to improve their managerial capabilities to properly meet the challenge of the new Navy. [6]

1. Leadership-Management Education and Training (LMET)

Responding to fleet demands for better leadership-management training of the Navy's middle managers, the Chief of Naval Operations tasked the Chief of Naval Education (CNET) in January 1975 to conduct an inquiry into Navy leadership training needs. [7] This tasking proved to be the genesis of a massive Navy project which

lead to the development of a comprehensive, systematic training program under the title of Leadership and Management Education and Training (LMET). The purpose of this program is to eventually replace the 157 leadership-management courses and training programs that now independently exist throughout the Navy with a coordinated training plan under one central program sponsorship. [8] It is envisioned that this new approach will eliminate much of the redundancy between programs and make more efficient use of Navy training resources.

One of the essential elements of this new program is the identification of the leadership and management skills which are indicative of superior performance. To determine what these skills are, the McBer and Company Consulting Firm was contracted by the Bureau of Naval Personnel to conduct interviews of over 200 officer and enlisted leaders from the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets and in the Washington, D. C. area. Each interviewee was previously identified as a superior or average performer by his supervisor. During the interview each person was asked to describe critical leadership incidents in which they had participated. The responses to these interviews were then recorded and analyzed using a job competency assessment technique developed by Harvard University Professor David C. McClelland (1976). [9]

Based on this analysis twenty-eight discrete competency characteristics were identified. [10] These characteristics were later broken down into six universal skills which were determined to be common to superior performance at all levels in the chain of command. Subsequent performance classification tests conducted by McBer and Company using these universal skills demonstrated that these factors could distinguish superior from average performance at a highly significant level ($R=.93$, $p<.001$). [11] The universal skills identified in the LMET program are: (1) effective listening and counseling; (2) management

control; (3) problem solving influence versus authoritarian control; (4) proactive technical achievement behavior; (5) goal setting and delegation; and (6) calm, flexible conflict resolution.

The second major element of the LMET program is the determination that with the recent advances in testing techniques it is possible to objectively measure a person's competence in each of the universal skill areas. By using the results of these tests the Navy can tailor its leadership-management training to concentrate on those areas needing improvement. The Navy will also be able to measure the success of its training efforts by giving prior and post training tests.

The last major element of this program is the identification of the key billets in the officer and enlisted communities at which approximately eighty hours of leadership-management training would be provided. This training is designed to be given prior to the first assignment to each identified key billet and would be specially tailored to the particular leadership level being assumed. The enlisted key billets as defined in the LMET program are: recruit; petty officer; leading petty officer; leading chief petty officer; and Master Chief Petty Officer.

It is not envisioned that separate training programs would be required at each level. Rather, LMET courses will be incorporated into existing programs at the various levels such as during boot camp for recruits or during "A" schools for petty officers. Using this procedure, existing leadership courses will be systematically phased out and the resources presently employed to support these courses will be transferred to LMET courses. The principal advantage of the LMET program, as mentioned earlier, is that the new training provided at each level will be sequenced and supportive of training received at all other levels. Additionally, the entire training program will be coordinated by one central program sponsor.

2. Army Monograph Series

At approximately the same time (1975) as the Navy was beginning its study and development of the LMET program, a similar but independent effort was begun by the US Army. This recent Army study is the eighth in a series of Leadership Monograph Studies which were designed to study methods of improving the Army's leadership ability. The purpose of monograph #8 was to determine what it is that superior leaders do that makes them superior. However, in contrast to the Navy study which relied upon interviews to identify competency characteristics of superior leaders, the Army study employed an extensive review of behavioral research, management literature, and a survey of prominent industrial executive development programs. [12] Despite the different approaches used by these independent groups, the leadership skills identified and the conclusions drawn in their reports are quite similar and appear to be corroborative.

To begin with, both studies recognized that leadership development is not a one-time event but rather a successive, long-term process. This process must build on both previous training and prior experience. The theory of progressive development also recognizes the appropriateness of a given behavior at a given level by taking into consideration the interrelatedness of position, role, function and behavior. [13]

Secondly, to ensure a person is properly prepared to assume a leadership-management position, the Army research recommends that the training should be tailored to the level being assumed and given prior to advancing to that position. This same philosophy is recommended in the Navy's LMET program.

Lastly, both studies reported that separate leadership-management skills could be identified. More importantly, the studies also stated that a person's

competence in these skills could be tested and if needed, improved through training. The only noted difference between the two reports was in the number of leadership-management skills identified. The Army report addressed nine skills and the Navy six. The Army skills are: communication; human relations; counseling; supervision; technical; management science; decision making; planning; and ethics. [14] However, the Army report went on to state that the specific number of skills is not important as long as the skills identified encompass all organizationally relevant leadership behaviors. [15] A comparison of the skills identified in the two reports supports this conclusion.

3. HRM Survey

An inquiry into the responses of approximately nine thousand First Class Petty Officers in the Navy Human Resources Management (HRM) Survey data bank (Bupers 5314-6), further substantiates the general perception that the Navy's middle managers are not performing as well as they could.

The information presented in this data bank was collected from one hundred and sixty commands throughout the Navy during the period of January 1976 to March 1977 as part of a regularly scheduled organization development program called a Human Resource Management Cycle. The HRM survey is conducted through the use of a questionnaire which can be computer processed to provide a summary of the answers in statistical form. The purpose of this survey is to provide information to the Navy's leaders on areas requiring more organizational effectiveness or corrective action. In addition to the generally expected areas of equal opportunity, race relations, motivation and morale, and drug and alcohol abuse, this survey also looks at leadership, training and utilization of people, and good order and discipline.

For purposes of this thesis, thirteen survey

questions relating to the dimensions of supervisory leadership and leadership training were selected from the questionnaire. The responses to these questions were then analyzed to assess the perceived leadership performance of Chief Petty Officers as seen by their immediate subordinate First Class Petty Officers. One question was also used to determine if adequate leadership training is presently being provided at the local command level. Although the survey did not breakdown the category of supervisor by pay grade, it has been assumed that First Class Petty Officers see all their chiefs as being basically the same. This assumption seems reasonable when it is noted that the same billet at different commands is frequently filled by Chief Petty Officers of different grades. [16]

Due to the extremely large sample size in this survey, the results provided are statistically significant ($p=.99$ $sd=.006$) and inferences can be drawn about the entire population from this sampling. Responses of a 3 or lower on a maximum scale of 5 were considered to be indicators of unsatisfactory performance and areas for concern to Navy leaders. The percentage of responses falling into this category from the supervisory leadership questions ranged from 24.6 to 53.6 per cent. Additionally, 63.2 per cent of those sampled felt they were not being adequately trained in leadership skills by their local commands. These figures support the need for improved leadership performance of the Navy's middle managers and also indicate that sufficient leadership training is not presently being provided by the local commands. The results of this statistical analysis of selected portions of the Human Resources Management Survey data bank are found in Appendix C.

4. Survey of Civilian Industries

To provide a test comparison of the military middle management situation with that of the civilian sector a

sample survey of three civilian companies in the local Monterey area was conducted. The purpose of this survey was to determine if civilian industry was facing similar middle manager, leadership problems and if so, to determine what corrective action they were taking. The companies contacted were: Firestone Tire and Rubber Company; Schilling Division, McCormick and Company, Incorporated; and Smuckers Company. Interviews with the director of the Personnel and Training Departments of each company were held and the above issues were discussed.

Although no specific problems were identified, each company reported general problems in the areas of plant productivity, high worker absenteeism, and high personnel turnover. All of these problems were partially attributed to leadership weaknesses in their middle managers and partially to the quality of the personnel hired. Because of their clear differentiation between upper management and front-line supervisors, none of these problems were felt to be the result of an overlap of authority or responsibility at the middle management level. All three companies did report, however, that during their research they discovered that in the divisions in which there appeared to be a good working relationship between the supervisor and the workers, they had less of the above described problems. Based on this general perception and their desire to reduce these types of problems, each plant had developed some form of middle manager training program.

Of the three companies surveyed, only Firestone had a formal, company-wide training program. However, the essential elements of all three companies' training programs were basically the same. Each consisted of in-house seminars, lectures by the American Management Association (AMA), and extensive use of night classes offered by local colleges.

In contrast to upper management personnel which are typically college graduates recruited from outside the

company, front-line supervisors are generally selected from within the blue collar work force. To qualify for consideration for a supervisory position, a worker is required to formally submit his request through his supervisor. Based on an upper management review of his supervisor's recommendation, his past work record, and his absenteeism record, he is then interviewed by the director of the personnel department. If his request is approved he is then enrolled in the company's in-house middle manager development program. He is also advised of the various courses available which are recommended to improve his managerial ability and are offered at the local college night school. This procedure obviously places most of the responsibility for advancement on the individual.

If a worker attends night school and a passing grade of "c" or higher is earned, the company will refund 75 per cent of the cost. Satisfactory completion of this program still does not guarantee a worker a supervisory position but it does improve his chances for selection.

Further researcher discussions with the training directors of the three companies revealed that because of their practice of selecting supervisors from within the existing work force, no additional technical training was required in their management training programs. Technical training was generally limited to special company schools or to on-the-job training. By the time a man was selected for a supervisory position he had normally been with the company for several years and had usually received all the technical training he would need as a manager. The purpose of the management training programs as stated by Mr. Rob Colyn of Firestone Company was therefore, "to provide the supervisor the skills needed to efficiently manage his men and material

to achieve the company's goals." A sampling of the types of courses recommended by these companies are: effective speaking; problem solving and decision making; counseling; leadership; time management; human relations; and communications. [17]

III. PROGRAMS

A. ASSUMPTIONS

Before considering what programs are available for providing leadership-management training and which one might be the most cost effective, several assumptions need to be established to provide a structure within which the alternatives will be compared. To begin with, it will be assumed that any of the potential alternatives, given sufficient time, funding, and management and individual effort, could produce qualified middle managers. The term "qualified" will be defined by the academic standard of satisfactorily completing the program.

Secondly, individuals selected to participate in this training would be assumed to possess sufficient capability and dedication to improve their ability to perform as middle managers. Standardized selection criteria could be controlled by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Thirdly, in keeping with the Pers 23 proposed rating descriptions in which E-7's are identified as the senior in-rate technician and E-8 - E-9's as managers-supervisors, only E-8's and E-8 selectees would be eligible to participate in any of the programs. However, as an interim measure to provide this late career training to personnel presently serving as Master Chief Petty Officers, a certain percentage of the initial classes should be allotted to E-9's. The percentage and the number of classes affected could be determined by the Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Fourth, since it is possible to acquire a similar education without attending a formal Navy program,

completion of any one of the alternatives will not be a prerequisite for further advancement. This guideline, however, should not preclude the granting of an increased promotion multiple for successful completion of any of the alternative programs.

Lastly, in keeping with current Navy practice and policy, a standard service obligation for a specified period of time would be required following attendance of any of the programs.

B. CRITERIA

The above assumptions have established the baseline on which to consider potential alternatives. The following paragraphs define the criteria against which the alternatives will be evaluated. The criteria have been grouped into two categories. The first category identifies the criteria considered absolutely essential for any potential program. The second category identifies nice-to-have characteristics in a program. (Although valuable, these nice-to-have characteristics are not considered absolutely essential for a program to exist.)

Essential

1. Management Skills - the program must provide the management skills necessary to improve the managerial performance of the Navy's middle managers.
2. Effectiveness - graduates of the program should increase the efficient use of the Navy's resources and improve the over-all effectiveness of the Navy in accomplishing its objectives.
3. Student Loading - to achieve a goal of training approximately ten per cent of the Navy's E-8's annually, the program should have an eventual capacity

of 800-850 students per year. However, for purposes of a pilot program, a capacity of 400 students per year should provide sufficient information on which to make an evaluation.

4. Lost Time - Navy personnel receive their salaries whether they are working and providing a service or in school studying. Therefore, to minimize the costs for which no service is provided, the training program selected should minimize this "lost time" to the Navy.
5. Management Control - to enable the Navy to exert direct control over the training, the program must be easily standardized yet responsive to designed changes.

Nice-To-Have

6. Retention - the program should have a positive effect on the Senior Chief Petty Officer's desire to remain on active duty.
7. Pride and Self Esteem - the student should "feel" a sense of pride in his selection to and graduation from the program. This "feeling" should enhance his self-esteem and have a positive effect on his allegiance to the Navy.
8. Accredited - to ensure the quality of the education provided, both real and as perceived by the students, the program should be accredited by the governing Association of Schools and Colleges.
9. Supervision - to maximize the education provided, the student to instructor ratio should be relatively small (12-15:1).
10. Orientation - although the courses should be grounded in academic disciplines, they should emphasize Navy applications through appropriate examples.

11. Immediate Return on Investment (ROI) - to provide the quickest results to the Navy, the duration of the program should be as short as possible.
12. Navy Topics - to enhance the students knowledge of the Navy, the program should include special Navy courses (ie. Navy Organization and Administration, Navy Supply System, the Navy's role in foreign policy, etc.).

C. ALTERNATIVES

Alternatives investigated for providing leadership-management training to Senior Chief Petty Officers are listed below. Not every alternative investigated proved to be feasible and, therefore, some are listed only to indicate areas considered during this thesis research. The alternatives are:

1. Creation of a Navy Senior Chief Petty Officer Academy
2. Use of other services' Non-commissioned Officer Academies
3. Use of civilian colleges on a full-time basis
4. Use of the College Extension Program
5. Use of Correspondence Courses

A brief description of each alternative program is provided in the following paragraphs. Where appropriate, cost data are displayed on a cost per student or cost per student per week basis.

1. Navy SCPO Academy

As a result of recommendations from both the CINCPACFLT-CINCLANTFLT Retention Conferences in 1975, and the CNO MCPO Advisory Panel of October 1976, the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Chief of Naval Education and

Training (CNET) to investigate possible sites and to provide cost planning estimates for a Navy CPO Academy. In an effort to keep start-up costs to a minimum, renovation and conversion of existing facilities was determined by the CNET staff to be the most economical approach. (This approach has already been proven feasible by both the Army and Air Force NCO Academies.) The conversion of an old hospital at NAS Pensacola (bldg. 628), for an estimated cost of 2.7 million dollars has been recommended as the best available site. [18] This building has the capacity to provide both berthing and training space under one roof. The conversion also has the added benefit of providing a useful new life to a permanent Navy facility. Selection of this building was based on a planned annual throughput of 400 students per year. Classes would meet four times a year with one hundred students per class. This number of students appears satisfactory for an initial pilot program and should provide sufficient information for an accurate assessment of the value of the school. This school could eventually graduate approximately 800-850 students a year. This larger number represents approximately 10 percent of the Navy's E-8 strength and would supplement the average annual attrition from the E-8 - E-9 ranks. This number also coincides with the annual shore to sea rotation figures for Senior Chief Petty Officers. [19]

To overcome some of the problems that plagued the original CPO Academy, it is recommended that SCPO's be ordered through the school enroute to their next at-sea duty. This procedure would eliminate the former, disruptive practice of sending a man to school in a Temporary Additional Duty (TAD) status. Additionally, training costs should be funded by the Bureau of Naval Personnel as part of the permanent change of station (PCS) orders. This procedure would alleviate another problem of the first CPO Academy.

Because this school would provide valuable training

for all future assignments at the Senior-Master CPO level, it is recommended that a percentage of the initial classes be made available to E-9's. The exact number could be determined by Bupers. Follow on classes should be restricted to E-8's and E-8 selectees. This selection criteria would be in keeping with the proposed distinction between E-7's as technicians and E-8 - E-9's as managers. It is further recommended that formal nomination and selection procedures be established. Various commands could submit the names of those personnel who qualify and are recommended for consideration to attend the school. A formal board could then be convened by the Chief of Naval Personnel to make the final selection. Standard selection procedures, similar to those used to select officers to attend the Naval Postgraduate School, or War College, would ensure consistency and the highest quality input. It would also serve to highlight the intent of the program to train only those who have demonstrated outstanding potential to assume positions of greater responsibility.

To support the purpose of the school and to provide the quality education needed by the Navy's middle managers, a challenging, demanding curriculum should be taught that will both tax the student's capabilities and expand his intellectual capacity. Although it is not intended that a final degree be presented, the curriculum should be accredited by the governing association of schools and colleges. Based on a review of existing courses, suggestions from deans of civilian colleges, and discussions with personnel in the Navy training commands, a course of approximately ten (10) weeks would be required to provide the education desired. The proposed curriculum should cover the following areas: Human Relations; Counseling; Supervision; Management Science; Decision Making; Planning; Ethics; Communications; World Studies with special emphasis on National Defense and the Navy's role in foreign policy; and lastly, special Navy related subjects on administration

and organization. It also is strongly recommended that the curriculum be coordinated with the training provided by the Navy's LMET program and in fact be considered as the capstone to this training effort. This philosophy is already practiced in the other services and it is noted that the Navy is the only service to date that does not provide a late-career training opportunity. It has been estimated that to develop the above curriculum would take approximately one year and 1.5 million dollars. [20]

In keeping with the image of the school as an academic institution for middle managers, it is recommended no formal athletic program or requirements be established during school hours. It is hoped that those personnel who would be selected to attend the school would already possess the personal drive to keep themselves physically fit on their own time.

To further attest to the credibility of the school, it is recommended that a mixed faculty of military and civilian instructors be used. Acquiring the knowledge to properly teach certain subjects can only be accomplished through years of academic study at the undergraduate and graduate levels. Other subjects require years of practical experience before a thorough understanding can be achieved. To complement the variety of subjects to be taught, yet to ensure the curriculum is sufficiently tailored to Navy needs, both types of personnel are desirable. The Air Force Senior NCO Academy is presently using this approach and the Commandant of this school has suggested that it is superior to a one-sided faculty.

Lastly, it is recommended that a one year obligation be required upon graduation from this academy. This requirement would be in excess of current Navy directives governing service requirements following formal training, but it is in keeping with the standard practice of the other services for this type of program. It also would ensure at least a minimum payback for the Navy's investment.

Based on current cost estimates provided to the CNO by the Chief of Naval Education and Training, the cost of building and operating a Navy SCPO Academy is provided in the accompanying table.

Table I

US NAVY SCPO ACADEMY
(course length 10 weeks)
PRO RATA COST/STUDENT

DIRECT COSTS

1.	Curriculum development \$1.5 million, amortized over 5 years and 400 students/year	750 ¹
2.	MILCON for bldg. conversion \$2.712 million, amortized over 5 years and 400 students/year	1,361 ²
3.	Student pay and allowances (10 weeks)	4,376 ³
4.	Student travel (one way). Travel from the academy is relevant to the next command	
	Coast to Coast 200	
	One Coast <u>100</u>	
	Average 150	150 ⁴
5.	Per diem \$2.00/day x 75 days	150 ⁴
6.	Civilian instructor pay 5 instructors x \$20,000/year = \$100,000 amortized over 400 students/year	250
7.	O & MN \$460,000 amortized over 400 students/year	<u>1,150</u> ²
	SUBTOTAL	<u>\$8,187</u>

INDIRECT COSTS

1.	Base support unknown - estimated to be the same as US Army Sergeants Major Academy	<u>1,837</u>
	SUBTOTAL	<u>\$1,837</u>

TOTAL COST/STUDENT \$10,024

AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK \$1,002

Table I
(continued)

NOTES

1. Curriculum development costs estimated by the Naval Education Training Program Development Center (NETPDC), 22 April 1977.
2. MILCON and O & MN estimated by Chief Naval Education and Training (CNET) as reported to CNO, 27 April 1977.
3. Student pay based on B - K Dynamics, Inc., Billet Cost Users Manuel, p. D-1, prepared for the Bureau of Naval Personnel, Pers 212, November, 1976. Values presented represent the full life-cycle cost of an average E-8 for 10 weeks.
4. Student travel and per diem costs based on Standard Costs obtained from, Travel Regulations Manuel, volume I.

2. Use of other services' NCO Academies

The following paragraphs provide a brief description of the programs and training costs of the other services' NCO academies.

a. US Army Sergeants Major Academy

The Army's Sergeants Major Academy is located on the grounds of an active Army base outside El Paso, Texas called Fort Bliss. The school became operational in January 1973 and presently has a student enrollment of two hundred students, sixteen of whom are Navy Senior Petty Officers (E-8 - E-9). Within the physical constraints of existing school facilities and family housing units, the school could expand to a total enrollment of two hundred and forty students. The school graduates two classes a year with each class completing twenty-two weeks of instruction. The academy is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools and awards 18 semester hours of college credit. The Army NCO Academy also provides an additional six hours of college credit through a joint program with the El Paso Community College. All instructors at the academy are Army personnel. The academic day consists of six hours of classroom instruction (12-14 students per class) which emphasizes the seminar or working group approach. Classroom instruction is supplemented by guest lecturers, case studies, oral and written presentations, and practical examinations. An additional four hours of individual study is usually required per day. The school is fully equipped with modern educational facilities and has a small library to support individual student research. Students also have access to the El Paso Community College library and are encouraged to take advantage of these facilities.

The academy's philosophy is based on the "whole-man" concept and has as one of its stated benefits that, "It allows for the close association of professional

contemporaries in the academic as well as social environment. This association provides students and their families the opportunity to exchange ideas and experiences, thus increasing the educational benefits through personal communication." The mission of the academy as stated in the school's information handbook is, "To provide a program of study to prepare selected noncommissioned officers for positions of greater responsibility throughout the defense establishment." A breakdown of training costs per student is provided in the accompanying table. A listing of courses and hours of classroom instruction is provided in appendix D.

Table II

US ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY

(course length 22 weeks)

PRO RATA COST/STUDENT

	<u>OP. & MAINT.</u>	<u>MIL PERS</u>	<u>FAMILY HOUSING MAINTENANCE ACT.</u>
<u>DIRECT COSTS</u>			
1. Mission			
a. Instructor ¹	98	1964	-
b. Other	1457	1494	-
2. Student Pay/Allow. ²	-	9628	-
3. Travel (one way) ³	-	3000	-
SUBTOTAL	<u>1557</u>	<u>16,086</u>	
<u>INDIRECT COSTS</u>			
1. Base Ops	1232	621	-
2. Support			
a. Training Aides	95	16	-
b. Other	<u>249</u>	<u>289</u>	<u>26</u>
SUBTOTAL	<u>1576</u>	<u>926</u>	<u>26</u>
TOTAL	<u>\$3131</u>	<u>\$17,012</u>	<u>\$26</u>
TOTAL COST/STUDENT	<u>\$20.169</u>		
TOTAL COST/STUDENT/WEEK	<u>\$917</u>		

NOTES

1. Instructor training costs are amortized over a four year tour.
2. Student pay/allowances was taken from B-K Dynamics, Inc., Billet Cost Model Users Manual, p. D-1, prepared for the Bureau of Naval Personnel, PERS 212, Nov. 1976. Figures presented represent the full life-cycle cost of an average E-8 for twenty-two weeks.

Table II

NOTES (continued)

3. Travel costs based on actual historical cost data and average student loading per year as provided by YNC Key, PERS 52, Bureau of Naval Personnel.

Average Family with two Children

a.	From East Coast	\$2000
b.	From West Coast	\$3400
c.	Outside CONUS	\$7000

Average number of students from geographic area

a.	East Coast	17 per year
b.	West Coast	12 per year
c.	Non-CONUS	3 per year

Average cost per family per move

a.	East	17 x 2000 =	34,000
b.	West	12 x 3400 =	40,800
c.	O/Seas	3 x 7000 =	21,000
		32	95,800

Average Travel cost per family

\$2,993.75

4. Other costs provided by Capt. Edward J. Wagner, Jr., US Army, Controller SMA, Fort Bliss, Texas.

b. US Air Force Senior NCO Academy

The Air Force Senior NCO Academy is located at Gunter Air Force Station just outside of Montgomery, Alabama. The school was officially activated in July 1972, and following the renovation and refurbishing of existing buildings, classes began in January 1973. Classes consist of both male and female members of the US Air Force, Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserves. The school graduates five classes a year with 240 students per class. Existing berthing facilities do not permit expansion of this class size. The academy faculty consists of both civilian and military instructors, a large percentage of whom have university degrees at the baccalaureate level or higher. The academic day consists of seven hours of classroom instruction primarily in the form of twelve-man discussion seminars. Similar to the Army NCO Academy, this course of instruction is supplemented with guest lecturers, both military and civilian, case studies, and independent student research. The academy considers itself unique from the other Air Force schools in four major ways. First, the school provides professional military education to Senior Air Force NCO's from all major commands. Second, it has the capability to tailor its program specifically to the needs of the management-level NCO. Third, because of its nine-week course length, it is able to cover areas not explored in shorter courses. Lastly, 36 hours of classroom time are set aside to permit the student the latitude of selecting additional instruction, primarily in the management area. [21] The students are also encouraged to select current Air Force problems for the topics of their research papers. The school's facilities are excellent and should it be needed, the main library of the Air University at near-by Maxwell Air Force Base is also available.

The academy's philosophy is based on the premise that the Senior NCO selected to attend the school brings

with him some understanding and competence in all areas of the curriculum. It also assumes that each student knows himself and his needs and that he desires to play an active role in his own education. In keeping with this spirit, the academy presents basic principles and concepts by which the military operates and encourages each student to identify, seek out, and obtain the in-depth knowledge he requires to improve himself and his ability as a supervisor. The curriculum emphasizes current Air Force management problems especially those likely to be encountered by the Senior NCO. This school, however, stresses the academic approach to problem solving as opposed to training standardized responses to routine problems.

In an attempt to further student commitment to their own improvement, the school does not publish grades nor rank the students against one another. Rather, each student takes a battery of pre-tests upon his arrival at the academy and with the assistance of his faculty advisor, establishes improvement goals for himself. Periodic objective tests are given to measure his progress. However, the results are discussed in private with the advisor. The academy believes this procedure to be a particularly strong factor in its program and is especially proud of the close working relationship that develops between the faculty advisor and his students.

The academy is accredited by the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools. It is also affiliated with the Community College of the Air Force (CCAF) which allows eleven semester hours of credit towards a Career Education Certificate. The mission of the academy as stated in the school handbook is, "to conduct a program of professional military education to prepare selected senior noncommissioned officers to better fulfill their leadership and management responsibilities." See Appendix E for the curriculum and hours of instruction. Costs for this program are displayed in the accompanying table.

Table III

US AIR FORCE SENIOR NCO ACADEMY
(course length 9 weeks)
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET

DIRECT COSTS

1.	Pay Roll	
	a. Civilian Instructor/Staff	100.7
	b. Military	-
2.	Student per diem	193.5
3.	Student pay	-
4.	Travel	209.3
5.	Supplies	9.0
6.	Other	<u>10.0</u>
	SUBTOTAL	<u>522.5</u>

INDIRECT COSTS

1.	Guest speaker travel	9.4
2.	Equipment rental	4.9
3.	Printing	31.2
4.	Misc. service	
	a. Reprints	.8
	b. Guest lecture fees	3.2
	c. Misc.	.1
	d. Equipment	5.0
5.	Base Support	<u>-</u>
	SUBTOTAL	<u>54.6</u>

TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET \$577.1

AVERAGE COST/STUDENT¹ \$480

AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK \$926

Table III

(continued)

NOTES

1. This figure does not include the cost of base support, student pay and allowances or instructor training costs. Assuming the costs for base support and instructor training would be approximately the same as the Army's Sergeants Major Academy and using the standard pay and allowances from the Billet Cost Users Manual, the average cost per student per week is recomputed below:

Previous Cost/Student	480
Instructor training costs (pro rata)	2,062
Base Support (pro rata)	1,853
Student Pay (9 weeks)	<u>3,939</u>
AVERAGE TOTAL COST/STUDENT	<u>\$8,334</u>
AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK	<u>\$926</u>

2. Other costs provided by Col. Eugene D. Levy, Commandant, USAF Senior NCO Academy.

c. US Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy

The Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy is located in Quantico, Virginia. The school was activated in June 1971, and provides leadership training to Marine Corps Noncommissioned Officers. Unlike the Army and Air Force academies, the Marine Corps Academy program is dedicated to training E-6's vice E-8's and E-9's. Because of differences in organizational structure within the Marine Corps, late career training for E-8's and E-9's is provided at separate schools and is tied directly to the NCC's professional specialty. Personnel pursuing technical-maintenance oriented careers are provided in-rate, specialty training to enable them to become Master Sergeants. Other senior NCO's who are personnel-administrative specialists are trained to become First Sergeants.

The course of instruction at the Staff NCO Academy is six weeks long. Each class consists of approximately 125 students and the school graduates five classes a year. Because of the rank of the students and the type of assignments students are normally sent to, the curriculum emphasis is different from either the Army or Air Force Academies. The objective of the Marine Corps Academy is to develop within the individual NCO the qualities required to discharge the duties and responsibilities of a staff sergeant or gunnery sergeant. More emphasis is, therefore, placed on individual leadership skills and physical fitness. The 240 hour course of instruction reflects these objectives and spends 60 per cent of its time on leadership and physical fitness and the remaining 40 per cent on special military related subjects. A curriculum syllabus is provided in Appendix F.

The mission of the Academy as presented in the general information booklet is, "To provide staff NCC's of demonstrated potential with the requisite education and leadership training to enhance their professional

qualifications in preparation for assuming duties of greater contribution to the Corps." Cost data for operating this school is provided in the accompanying table.

Table IV

US MARINE CORPS STAFF NCO ACADEMY

(course length 6 weeks)

ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET

DIRECT COST

1. Military Labor (Instr./Staff)	466,609
2. Civilian Labor	9,974
3. Material and Supplies	4,601
4. Student Pay	<u>-</u>
SUBTOTAL	<u>\$481,184</u>

INDIRECT COST

1. Base Operating Support	386,750
2. Educational Center	<u>17,503</u>
SUBTOTAL	<u>\$404,253</u>

TOTAL ANNUAL OPERATING BUDGET	<u>\$885,437</u>
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AVERAGE COST/STUDENT ¹	<u>\$1,417</u>
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AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK	<u>\$610</u>
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NOTES

1. The above cost/student figure does not include travel and student pay and allowances. Using estimates provided for travel costs by the Air Force and the Billet Cost Users Manuel for pay and allowances, this figure is recomputed below:

Average Cost/Student (from above)	1,417
Travel (based on Air Force estimate, two way)	175
Pay and Allowances (E-6, 6 weeks)	<u>2,067</u>
TOTAL AVERAGE COST/STUDENT	<u>\$3,659</u>

3. Civilian Colleges

To investigate the possibility of using civilian schools or colleges to provide the desired training, four organizations were contacted. The colleges contacted were the University of San Diego (School of Business Administration) and San Diego State University (College of Extended Studies-Military Education Programs). Golden Gate University and Chapman College were also contacted because it was known that these schools already provide special programs tailored to military needs. All parties contacted expressed an interest in the program and indicated that they would be willing to formally discuss such a proposal with the Navy. Based on this research it has been assumed that other colleges located near large Naval installations would also be willing to provide similar programs. Their individual responses are discussed in the following paragraphs.

a. University of San Diego

Dr. James M. Burns, Dean of the School of Business, recommended a specialized program designed for Chief Petty Officers would best fulfill the Navy's needs. Although the courses would be solidly grounded in academic disciplines, he felt that the special program would permit them to be oriented towards Navy problems. To design such a curriculum he estimated would cost approximately \$500,000 to \$600,000. The cost per student for a ten to twelve week program would then be about \$1500 to \$2000. Using these figures and an assumed five year program with 400 students per year, a total cost estimate is calculated below.

Table V

UNIVERSITY OF SAN DIEGO
(course length 10 weeks)
FULLY-FUNDED NAVY PROGRAM

1.	Curriculum Development (\$550,000) Amortized over 2000 students	275
2.	Tuition costs/student	1,775
3.	Student Pay and Allowances (E-8, 10 weeks)	<u>4,376</u>
	TOTAL AVERAGE COST/STUDENT	<u>\$6,326</u>
	AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK	<u>\$633</u>

NOTES

1. Incidental costs for books and supplies would be paid for by the student.
2. No travel costs are calculated because it is assumed all students would be from the local area and that the college selected would be within easy commuting distance to each Navy installation.
3. Pay and allowances represent the opportunity costs for the services lost to the Navy while the Senior Chief Petty Officer is a full-time student.

b. San Diego State University (SDSU)

Mr. David J. Hunter, Director of Military Education Programs responded for San Diego State University. He stated there were no foreseeable problems implementing such a program at SDSU for the Navy and that his school would be very interested in pursuing this proposal on a formal basis. SDSU is presently a member of the Serviceman's Opportunity College (SOC). SOC is an organization designed to assist the serviceman with his educational endeavors and confers regular and associate degrees through a variety of special military programs.

Due to the informal nature of this inquiry, Mr. Hunter stated exact program costs could not be provided because information necessary for budget and contract formulation was not known. However, the average cost per full-time student for the 1976-1977 school year was reported to be \$3091. This assumes that a full-time student is enrolled for 15 units of academic credit per semester. Each semester is 17 weeks long and there are two regular semesters per year. Using these figures as a standard, the average cost per student per week would be \$91.00.

Based on Mr. Hunter's assurances that the school could tailor its regular 17-week curriculum to 10-weeks for a special Navy program and using the average student cost per week of \$91.00, the cost for this program is calculated in the following table.

Table VI

SAN DIEGO STATE UNIVERSITY

(course length 10 weeks)

FULLY-FUNDED NAVY PROGRAM

1.	Tuition (10 weeks)	910
2.	Student Pay and Allowances (E-8, 10 weeks)	<u>4,376</u>
	TOTAL AVERAGE COST/STUDENT	<u>\$5,286</u>
	AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK	<u>\$529</u>
	REVISED AVERAGE COST/STUDENT/WEEK ³	<u>\$556</u>

NOTES

1. Curriculum development costs were not included for SDSU. No figure could be provided unless specific courses were requested.
2. Incidental expenses for books and school supplies would be paid for by the student.
3. To facilitate comparisons and to properly recognize the costs for curriculum development it has been assumed that curriculum development costs would be approximately the same as that for the University of San Diego. Using an average curriculum development cost of \$550,000 and amortizing this cost over 400 students for each of five years produces a revised average cost/student/week of \$556,00.

c. Chapman College and Golden Gate University

These two schools will be discussed together because of the similarity of their programs. Although these schools generally specialize in providing night classes for military students at various military installations, both indicated they would be interested in providing a special program at similar locations for full-time Navy students.

Because of the responsive and extremely flexible programs these schools offer, they have relied on the host activity to provide or rent all classroom and office space. They stated this requirement is usually not a major problem at most large Naval installations. It was noted, however, that the majority of their courses were only offered at night when classroom space is more easily available.

Further interviews with the school's representatives revealed that all operating and overhead expenses are usually absorbed by the host activity and that incidental school expenses for books and supplies are paid for by the individual students. This type of operating policy limits the schools' responsibilities to providing the instructors and to administering the program.

Based on the above information, it was determined that this type of program was primarily oriented to providing specific instructors for specific courses on a part-time basis. Although it is acknowledged that these schools provide a valuable service to the military, it was determined that they are not presently staffed nor organized to manage a program of the size being investigated. Further, the type of program these schools offer is not significantly different from alternative three, the college extension program. Based on these reasons, no further information was obtained from these schools.

4. College Extension Program

The college extension program is basically the

military version of "night school". Courses are offered by more than three hundred and fifty colleges throughout the country, conveniently located near most large Naval activities. Classes usually meet twice a week for three hours per session with normal class hours 6 to 9pm. The average course requires 8 to 10 weeks to complete and assuming satisfactory performance, provides three credit-hours of college level work. Students may either be required to attend classes on the schools campus or if special arrangements are required, some schools will send instructors to a Naval base if a classroom can be provided. A variety of courses are offered by these colleges and based on an interview with Ms. Sandra Scott of the Naval Education and Training Support Center, Pacific (NETSCPAC), most participating colleges would be willing to tailor their programs to fulfill a Navy need.

The costs per course vary widely depending on the type of course (college or graduate level, technical or general) and also between schools. Based on an average of 25 schools randomly selected from the Off Duty Education Catalog, the average cost for a three-credit course is approximately \$170.00. The Navy usually funds 75 per cent of this cost or approximately \$125.00. The academic load carried by the average student is one course per period with an annual average completion rate per student of two to three courses. (These averages were provided by NETSCPAC based on a three year average in the San Diego area.) Assuming the average E-8 enrolled in a special Navy program would complete the greater number of courses per year, it would take him approximately three years (9 courses) to complete a curriculum comparable to that proposed in the other alternatives. Although this is a significant period of time, the Navy does not give up the benefit of the man's services during this time. Therefore, there is no opportunity or salary costs to be accounted for with this program. There also are no travel or per diem costs to be

considered. Lastly, incidental costs for books and school supplies are paid for by the student.

Assuming the bulk of the courses offered could be easily modified to fit the Navy's needs, the average costs for this program are as follows:

Years	No of Courses	Cost/Course	Tctal	Present Value
1	3	125	375	375
2	3	125	375	412
3	3	125	375	454
Total Cost/Student				1241

(Assumes a discount rate of 10% and no inflation)

To encourage Senior Chief Petty Officers to make use of this program, the Navy could fund the entire costs of each course. Using the same calculations as above and a cost per course of \$170, the cost to the Navy per student would be \$1688. It is assumed some type of service obligation would also be incurred from using this program to prevent its abuse.

5. Correspondence Courses

The last alternative investigated was the use of correspondence courses. Although the costs and versatility of this alternative appeared desirable, the limitations imposed on the types of courses that could be adequately presented and the extremely poor completion rate experienced with this program, ruled out the possibility of its use. An analysis of the completion statistics for this program indicated that only five per cent of the students who enroll in a correspondence course ever complete it. [22] In view of the above, this program was not considered a viable alternative and , therefore, no further information was obtained.

IV. ANALYSIS

From an initial comparison of the bottom-line cost figures of the preceeding alternatives, the college extension program is obviously the least expensive. Such an analysis is, however, limited by only having accounted for those items for which a dollar value can be assigned. A complete analysis should look at all the costs and benefits, whether they are quantifiable in economic terms or not. To arrive at this final decision each training alternative will be carefully evaluated against the previcusly identified effectiveness criteria. To facilitate organizing the alternatives and criteria, a table has been provided at the end of this chapter.

Management Skills

The first assumption stated that any of the alternatives, given sufficient time, funding and effort, could produce qualified graduates. Implicit in this assumption is the belief that the quality of instruction would also be equivalent among alternatives. This assumes that a qualified graduate from one program would be ccmparable to a qualified graduate from any of the cther programs. Without an after-the-fact, clcseely-controlled experiment it would be impossible to realistically test the validity of this assumption. Therefore rather than attempting to resolve this dilemma, it will be assumed that there is no quality difference between programs and all alternatives will be given credit for adequately providing the desired management skills.

Effectiveness

The effect of the graduates on the Navy's overall efficency and effectiveness is another criterion that is impossible to predict. If it can be assumed that trained

people will perform better, then given sufficient time it should be possible to see a general improvement in the Navy's overall performance. However, it should be noted that the selection of candidates for any of these programs will have as much impact on the Navy's goals of improved efficiency and effectiveness as will the quality of the education provided. Recognizing this fact the Navy must ensure that only the highest quality personnel are selected. Standardized selection criteria, well publicized and uniformly applied through a central selection process would be the best means of consistently meeting this goal. Since the candidate selection criteria is independent of a comparison among alternatives and it has previously been suggested that trained people will perform better which will cause an overall improvement in the Navy's effectiveness, all alternatives will again be given full credit for fulfilling this criterion.

Student Loading

With respect to student loading, all alternatives with exception of the use of other service NCO academies can accomodate the number of students desired. All existing service NCC academies are physically limited by both classroom and living space available. The proposed Navy school can accomodate the student loading desired. However, the use of civilian colleges has the added advantage that no student berthing would be required. This advantage is possible because the colleges selected could be conveniently located near major Naval installations thereby allowing the students to live at home.

Lost Time

The salaries paid to the students is one of the largest factors contributing to the high training costs for all but the college extension program. If it can be assumed that the salaries paid to Naval personnel accurately reflect the cost of services provided, then in an economic analysis the opportunity cost of the services not provided must be considered as a cost of the training program.

The college extension program is the only alternative that does not require the Navy to give up the services of its personnel while they are in training. However, there are non-quantifiable costs involved with this alternative that should be considered. As mentioned earlier, the college extension program is run at night and normally requires outside preparation time in addition to the two, three-hour classes per week. This requirement must be added to the list of time demands on the Navy student such as duty nights, deployments, extended working hours, relaxation, and family time. If opportunity costs must be computed in an economic analysis, then this cost to the student should also be considered.

It could be argued, however, that attending night school while holding down a full-time job is something that is done by thousands of people every year. This fact can not be refuted. If it is assumed that there is little difference between job demands of the Navy and civilian life, then any man who genuinely desires to improve himself would be willing to accept this additional cost. The Navy professional concerned about his performance could be defined in this last group.

There are also additional costs to be considered for two of the other alternatives. In the case of the Army Sergeant's Major Academy the student has only two choices: (1) he can accept two back-to-back family moves within a period of six months; or (2) he can leave his family for the period of training. To the average Senior Chief Petty

Officer who has a family with school aged children and who has already experienced numerous long family separations, neither of these choices may be desirable.

Although the time period involved is significantly shorter for a Navy SCPO Academy, the choices available may be equally undesirable. If a student desires to bring his family with him he must do so at his own expense. If he decided not to bring them with him he would have to leave them behind at his old duty station or send them ahead to the new one. In either case the disruptive period of the move may be extended because of this enroute training. There may also be an additional financial cost to the student if it were necessary for him to return to his old duty station to help his family move. Although there are many variations and potential complications involved with providing enroute training during a permanent change of station (PCS) move, it should be pointed out that this procedure has been successfully used by the Navy for many years. Despite the personal inconvenience it may cause, there may not be a better least cost solution for all parties involved.

In view of the intent of this criterion which is to recognize only those programs that minimize the loss of productive time, with its associated high financial cost to the Navy, the college extension program would have to be considered as the best alternative meeting these requirements. However, the above non-quantifiable costs should still be taken into consideration when making a decision among programs.

Management Control

The last criterion considered to be absolutely essential to any Navy program is the ability of the Navy to directly exert management control over the program. The reason this control is seen as essential is not so much to ensure that a "standard" graduate is produced as it is to ensure that a standard curriculum is presented and that the program is

able to respond quickly to designed changes. Given these guidelines it would appear that an in-house Navy school would be the optimal solution. Although programs established at the other service academies or at civilian colleges would also have to be at least receptive to Navy demands, it is doubtful that any of these alternatives could be as responsive as a direct Navy chain of command. It also would be unreasonable to expect the other services to make major changes to their school's curriculums just to satisfy a Navy need. It would be equally unrealistic to expect the number of different civilian schools involved through the other alternatives to be as responsive as one Navy school, especially if the schools did not agree with the change. The Navy could drop a civilian school that would not agree to proposed changes, however, this action could be very disruptive to the overall program.

Retention

One of the most critical issues in the Navy today is retention. This concern for retention has become even more sensitive with the advent of the all volunteer force. Recent statistics released by the Bureau of Naval Personnel indicated that as of December 1976 the average years of service for a Master Chief Petty Officer was only twenty-four years and that this average was declining. [23] This fact appeared even more dismal when compared to the retention of E-9's in the other services for twenty-seven years of service. The difference between these figures seems to indicate that something could be done to improve the Navy's retention efforts for its enlisted middle managers.

The historical review presented earlier indicated that since the inception of the E-8 - E-9 program, this group has desired challenging billets with increased responsibility and authority commensurate with their rank and experience. It was further noted that early attempts to provide more challenging billets through rating compression failed

because the E-8 - E-9's were not properly trained to assume these new positions. Presently there is no way to accurately forecast the effect formal leadership-management training would have on job satisfaction and the retention of E-8 - E-9's. However, based on the retention statistics for the other services and recognizing the fact that the Navy is the only service presently not providing formal late career training, it could be argued that this training is one of the factors having a positive effect on the retention of E-8 - E-9's in the other services. Informal researcher interviews of Senior Chief Petty Officers attending the Army's Sergeant's Major Academy seemed to support this argument. Their statements, however, went on to emphasize that training is only part of the answer. In addition to being trained they still desire to be assigned to billets that would require them to use their training. In general they felt that providing one without the other would only increase their frustrations and cause a negative impact on their retention.

From the foregoing it appears that it may be impossible to separately evaluate the effect of training on retention. Additionally, it would be presumptuous to predict the outcome of a future decision of Navy leaders in regard to the utilization of E-8 - E-9's. Therefore, rather than attempting to weigh the potential differences between alternatives and their impact on retention, none of the alternatives will be given credit for this criterion.

Pride and Self-Esteem

Many officers feel a sense of pride and increased self-esteem as a result of their selection to attend post graduate school or a military college. It is also a generally accepted belief that selection for one of these schools is in some way a reward or recognition for outstanding service. Extending this reasoning to the enlisted ranks, it could be assumed that Senior Chief Petty Officers would view their selection and graduation from a

special Navy program in a similar manner. Inherent in this assumption is the requirement that this special program be perceived as being comparable to the officer schools and therefore desirable to the chief petty officers. It is unlikely that potential candidates for this training will presume the Navy does not intend to somehow recover the costs for its investment. However, this fact makes it no less gratifying to an individual to realize that the Navy thinks highly of him and is willing to make a significant investment in him. Further, the benefits of this perception may not be limited solely to those selected. If the Senior Chief Petty Officers selected truly represent the Navy's best, then others who would like to become members of this special group may make the necessary effort to ensure their performance would support their selection.

Of the alternatives considered, the college extension program is the least costly. However, it also appears to offer the least in terms of public recognition. Although a person could take great personal pride in acquiring this advanced education at night school while working full-time, it is doubtful he would feel any special pride in or allegiance to the organization that required him to do so on his own time, albeit paying 75 to 100 per cent of the costs. There also would be no feeling of pride in being "selected" since this program is available to everyone. Providing this training on "company time", however, not only provides a welcome break from normal duties but as Frederick Fiedler stated in his book, A Theory of Leadership Effectiveness, "it also allows the professional a chance to reflect on his career, widen his intellectual horizon, and raise his own morale and that of his subordinates." [24] The first three alternatives provide this late-career boost and, therefore, each will be given credit for fulfilling this criterion.

Accredited

The quality of the education provided in this program should meet at least college level requirements. The only

program that might not be automatically accredited would be an in-house Navy school. However, based on the credits awarded to the other service NCO academies, accrediting a Navy school should also be possible. All alternatives therefore have the ability to meet this criterion.

Supervision

The additional benefits derived by students who are closely monitored and supervised in the academic environment have been well documented by other academic institutions. Additionally, the other service NCO academies boast of their small student to instructor ratios and imply that they are able to produce a higher quality graduate because of this relationship. Once again all alternatives could be designed to provide a relatively small student to instructor ratio. However, because of the nature of the college extension program, instructors may not be available to assist students other than during classes. Additionally, due to the part-time aspect of this program, the same instructors may not even be available from course to course. The benefits derived from this program, therefore, may be of less value than from the other three. In each of the other alternatives, the instructors would be available on at least a daily basis and with the use of a service academy the instructors would be available throughout the program. Only these three alternatives will, therefore, be evaluated as fulfilling this requirement.

Orientation

With the exception of using other service NCO academies, each of the other alternatives could be developed as a special Navy program. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the curriculum could be built around Navy examples. Additionally, it could be expected that each student would contribute a wealth of personal examples to expand classroom discussions.

If using another services' NCO academy, it is equally reasonable to assume that the classroom examples presented

would normally be selected from within that service. This is the current practice at the Army Sergeant's Major Academy although it was noted that some classroom discussions were lead by Navy students using Navy examples. Except for these occasional discussions, the majority of the examples presented were selected for their appropriateness to Army problems. It is assumed the same would hold true if Navy students were allowed to attend the Air Force SNCO Academy. For this reason the use of another service NCO academy will not be given credit for this criterion.

Immediate Return On Investment

If leadership-management training does provide for improved performance by the graduates, then the sooner this improved performance is available and longer period over which it is provided the better the program should be considered. Each of the first three alternatives would produce fully qualified graduates in approximately ten to twenty-two weeks. The college extension program would require approximately three years. Using this criterion the first three alternatives would provide improved performance both earlier and, considering no effect on retention, over a longer period of time. This fact must be tempered with the realization that a person does not have to graduate to benefit from his training. The college extension program should provide some improvement in a Senior Chief Petty Officer's performance as he completes each course. It is reasonable to assume though, that a person who has completed the entire program should be better able to bring the full advantage of his education to bear on a problem than a person who has only completed a portion of it. Based on this assumption the college extension program does not fulfill this criterion.

Navy Topics

To ensure that Navy middle managers are knowledgeable and up-to-date on all special Navy management programs and procedures, late-career training should include time for

training in these topics. This training is considered vital for the development of knowledgeable Navy middle managers if they are to be expected to properly supervise and administer these programs in the fleet. For ease of coordination it would be desireable to include this training within the framework of a special Navy program. However, it would be possible to provide these topics at a separate Navy school or training center but to do so would be more burdensome. The only alternative, therefore, that has the ability to easily incorporate this training within its program structure is the Navy SCPO Academy.

A graphic display of the analysis of the subjective aspects of the Navy leadership-management training alternatives is provided in the accompanying table. The criteria are presented in the same order as discussed in the preceeding paragraphs.

Table VII

CRITERIA ANALYSIS

Criteria/ Alternatives	Navy Senior NCO Academy	Other service Academies	Civilian Colleges	College Extension
ESSENTIAL				
Management Skills	X	X	X	X
Effectiveness	X	X	X	X
Student Loading	X		X	X
Lost Time				X
Management Control	X			
NICE TO HAVE				
Retention				
Pride & Self-Esteem	X	X	X	
Accredited	X	X	X	X
Supervision	X	X	X	
Orientation	X		X	X
R.O.I.	X	X	X	
Navy Topics	X			
Raw Score	10	6	8	6
Possible Score	12	12	12	12
<div> MOST EXPENSIVE COST LEAST EXPENSIVE </div>				

V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This thesis has focused on the apparent problems with the Navy's E-8 - E-9 program and has attempted to identify what these problems are. From the results of the historical review presented in chapter II it is obvious that this is not the first investigation of these problems. It also is evident that despite the numerous recommended solutions offered during the past nineteen years, the basic problems have not significantly changed. Since the beginning of this program, Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have been promised new, different and challenging billets. To their frustration they have continued to be assigned and utilized as ordinary chief petty officers with almost no regard for their senior ranking. This problem continues today and has been reported to the Navy's leadership as recently as August 1977, by the Pers 23 study group. [25]

Since the signing of Public Law 85-422 in 1958, Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have been caught between the technical responsibilities assigned to E-7's and the managerial responsibilities assigned to Warrant and Limited Duty Officers. To add to their perceived sense of "not belonging", they have been defined by the Navy's leadership as middle managers but have been assigned and treated at the working level as senior technicians. The results of these actions can be used to explain at least partially the low retention rates for Navy E-8 - E-9's and for the perceived loss of prestige by the group once called the "the backbone of the Navy". What makes this issue particularly disturbing is that the problems have been identified and reported continuously for almost twenty years. Throughout this time the Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers have continued to ask for challenging assignments that are commensurate with

their experience and seniority and that provide for increased authority and responsibility. In more recent years they have also asked for additional training to better prepare themselves for these assignments.

The need to improve the capabilities of the Navy's middle managers has also been recognized by Navy leaders at various levels in the chain of command. An example to this concern was expressed in a letter in 1971, from the Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet to the Chief of Naval Personnel in which he stated, "We have failed up to now to provide formal leadership training and guidance for our petty officers and as a result expect too much from on-the-job training. The leadership gap at the middle management level requires closing and this school (CPG Academy) would be the best way to get off the ground." [26]

Over the years the Navy's response to this perceived need has been the development of 157 various leadership courses or course sequences which are offered at 139 training locations. [27] The predominate emphasis of these courses is on organizational function and leadership styles with little attention being paid to the areas of human behavior and human resource management. The average cost for providing these leadership courses was reported by the Director of Leadership Training at the Naval Amphibious School in Coronado, California, to be three hundred dollars for a two-week course. This cost, however, does not include student pay and allowances, travel or per diem. If it is assumed that most students sent to this and the other major training commands are from the surrounding areas and are not paid travel or per diem, then the only additional costs to be considered are for pay and allowances. Using the average two-week cost for an E-8, this brings the total cost of this training to \$1176 per student. Although a study conducted by the CNET staff in 1975, could not state definitively that this training is ineffective in meeting fleet needs, it would appear that based on the information presented in this

thesis and the continued expressed concern of Navy leaders that it is not. If this assumption is correct, then one must decide which type of training program would be better.

This thesis has presented five alternative methods of providing the Navy's middle managers with leadership-management training and the costs involved with each. It also has proposed criteria for assessing the cost effectiveness of the alternatives and pointed out some of the non-quantifiable factors that should be taken into consideration.

Correspondence courses were eliminated as an alternative because with only a 5 per cent completion rate it is not an effective training system at any cost. Based on the number of students recommended to participate in this program, the use of the other services' NCO academies is also not feasible. The Air Force NCO Academy does not have any extra room for Navy students. The Army Sergeants Major Academy does not have sufficient room for a Navy program even if the student enrollment was enlarged to its full capacity of 240 students per class. Lastly, the Marine Corps Staff NCO Academy does not provide the desired curriculum nor is it geared to the desired student rank. Therefore, of the alternatives originally proposed only the extension program, the full-time use of civilian colleges, and the in-house Senior Chief Petty Officer Academy remain. The raw scores of these alternatives as measured against the proposed criteria are 6, 8, and 10 respectively. The costs ranged from \$1700 to \$10,020.

One of the principal objectives of the Pers 23 study group was to "evolve a larger role and greater prestige" for Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers. If the Navy is genuinely concerned about the prestige and self-esteem of its middle managers, then it is suggested that requiring this group to attend night school on their own time will add little to these perceptions. It is also noted that this alternative is already available to the Navy's middle

managers and yet for a number of undetermined reasons it is not extensively used. It is, therefore, doubted that making it a Navy policy that all Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers should attend night school to improve their managerial abilities will have much effect on the current attendance rate. In addition, since there would be no way to control who attended this program there would likely be no special sense of pride in being selected by the Navy nor any special allegiance felt towards the Navy as a result of attending this program. Lastly, the estimated duration of this program would tend to be an obstacle to completing the training during one normal duty assignment. It would also be almost impossible to use this program during an operational sea tour. For these reasons this alternative will be eliminated from further consideration.

Of the two alternatives remaining, the only major differences noted by this researcher were in the areas of management control and the ability to present Navy topics. There may also be some variation in the sense of pride perceived in attending a civilian school over a Navy school but this perception may also vary in the opposite direction or even between two civilian schools. This perception variance is not believed to be a significant factor and will not be considered.

If the Navy were to select one civilian college conveniently located near each major Naval installation, it is probable that there would be at least six colleges involved with this alternative. Although each school would probably require some type of liaison-administrative support, the cost of this support should not be significant and could be absorbed by the host activity. The ease with which the Navy could implement desired course changes, however, may be significant, especially if the colleges involved did not go along with the Navy recommendations. These changes could also involve additional costs for curriculum development or instructor training at each school. Since it is impossible

to measure the costs of these changes or to predict the frequency with which they might occur, the last criterion will now be investigated to determine if it might resolve this final decision point.

Since Senior and Master Chief Petty Officers are responsible for managing the various Navy programs, it would be advantageous to update their knowledge of these programs at the same time as they receive their other late-career training. Topics included under this heading would be unique to the Navy organization and would be best taught by Navy instructors. As mentioned earlier, it would be possible to provide this training at a Navy training command following completion of a program at a civilian college. However, to do so would involve additional cost and would be less convenient than incorporating the training into one program such as at a Navy SCPO Academy.

Based on an average of the time spent at the Army and Air Force NCC Academies devoted to presenting these topics, it has been assumed that it would take approximately two weeks to cover the same material at a Navy training command. If it is assumed that there is no cost difference for in-house, classroom training because of the subject matter, then it can be computed that it would cost approximately \$300 per student for this additional training. Adding again the cost of an average E-8 for two weeks, this brings the total additional cost to \$1176 per student. A comparison of the total cost per student for these two programs then shows the civilian college program to cost approximately \$7176 and the Navy SCPO Academy to cost \$10,020. It should be noted, however, that the Navy school costs have been estimated to be approximately \$80 more per student per week than either the Army or Air Force NCO academies. Recognizing that the Navy's estimate contains a degree of error and assuming that an average of the historic costs of the other two academies is likely to be a more accurate prediction of what a similar Navy school would cost, the revised total cost per student

for a Navy SCPO Academy would be nearer \$9200. Thus, the final bottom-line financial difference now appears to be about \$2024 per student.

The only differences left to consider are the inherent advantages of each alternative. The use of civilian schools offers the following advantages: (1) reduced capital investment; (2) an ability to be easily dissolved should the program prove unsatisfactory; and (3) less annual operating costs. A Navy school offers: (1) the appeal of a unique Navy school and its potential ability to attract prominent guest speakers from the civilian and military communities which would complement its training program; (2) the close association of professionals in both the academic and social environment that provides more opportunity for the exchange of thoughts and ideas which may enhance the educational process; and (3) the increased empathy between student and instructor as dedicated professionals in the same organization who are attempting to meet the challenges of a modern Navy. These last three points were considered to be extremely important by the commandants of both the Army and Air Force NCO academies.

The end result of this analysis is the realization that the final decision between these two alternatives cannot be made solely on the basis of a difference in dollar costs. Rather this decision becomes a subjective evaluation of the dollar value of the intangible benefits accrued to each alternative. With this realization in mind it is believed that the inherent advantages of a Navy school do outweigh this cost difference and it is recommended that the Navy establish a Senior Chief Petty Officer Academy.

APPENDIX A

LDO AND WO ROLE AND FUNCTION DEFINITIONS

. Limited Duty Officers and Warrant Officers must be familiar with the organization and functions of the various components of the Department of Defense, with particular reference to the assigned missions of the military services; organization and function of the Department of the Navy, including fleet and force commands; contents and scope of U. S. Navy Regulations, Information Security Program Regulation (DOD 5200.1R), Department of the Navy Supplement to the DOD Information Security Program Regulation (CPNAVINST 5520.1 series), Uniform Code of Military Justice (JAGINST 5800.8 series), Manual for Courts-Martial, and the Manual of the Judge Advocate General (JAGINST 5800.7 series); procedures for preparing, revising, and applying a watch, quarter and station bill and battle bill; Navy enlisted manpower and personnel classification standard systems; scope and use of Naval messages, letters and directives; methods and procedures for disaster control, and nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare defense; emergency firstaid procedures and techniques; conduct of personnel, material, and safety inspections; welfare agencies and services available to enlisted personnel. The foregoing should not be construed as a detailed listing of all the specific duties, responsibilities, and knowledge which may be required of the Limited Duty Officer or Warrant Officer. Watchstanding duties, collateral, and additional duty assignments, which are a command prerogative, vary according to the specific requirements of individual ships and stations. Even though qualifications pertaining to these duties have not been

included, Limited Duty and Warrant Officers are responsible for carrying such assignments as required.

APPENDIX B

E-7, E-8, E-9 ROLE AND FUNCTION DEFINITIONS

A. CHIEF PETTY OFFICER (E-7)

The Chief Petty Officer is the top technical authority and expert within a rating. The Chief Petty Officer is capable of accomplishing all tasks normal to a rating and uses technical expertise in accomplishing these tasks. The Chief Petty Officer provides the direct supervision, instruction and training of lower rated personnel.

B. SENIOR CHIEF PETTY OFFICER (E-8)

The senior technical supervisor within a rating or occupational field with primary responsibility of supervision and training of enlisted personnel oriented upon system and subsystem maintenance, repair and operation. Based upon wide ranging experience and specialized training, the Senior Chief Petty Officer should provide the command with technical expertise and, dependent upon command manning, could be expected to perform in the role of a Master Chief Petty Officer in terms of administrative and managerial responsibility.

C. MASTER CHIEF PETTY OFFICER (E-9)

The senior enlisted Petty Officer in the United States Navy and as such is vested with special command trust and confidence extending to the administration and management function involving enlisted personnel. Based upon experience, proven performance and technical knowledge necessary to the achievement of Master Chief Petty Officer, individuals of that rate within a command will hold commensurate positions and should be expected to contribute in matters of policy formulation as well as implementation within their occupational field or across the full Navy rating spectrum.

APPENDIX C

HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT SURVEY DATA BANK

PRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NNAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

C16 HOW FRIENDLY AND EASY TO APPROACH IS YOUR SUPERVISOR?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	294	3.3	3.3	3.3
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	488	5.4	5.4	8.7
SOME EXTENT	3.	1423	15.8	15.5	24.6
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	2108	34.5	34.6	59.2
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	3658	40.6	40.8	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	48	0.5	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	5019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8571 MISSING CASES 48

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NCNAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

C17 WHEN YOU TALK WITH YOUR SUPERVISOR, TO WHAT EXTENT DOES HE PAY ATTENTION TO WHAT YOU ARE SAYING?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	314	3.5	3.5	3.5
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	633	7.0	7.0	10.5
SOME EXTENT	3.	1824	20.2	20.3	30.8
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	3272	36.3	36.4	67.3
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	2942	32.6	32.7	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	34	0.4	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 6985 MISSING CASES 34

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE Ncname (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

Q18 TO WHAT EXTENT IS YOUR SUPERVISOR WILLING TO LISTEN TO YOUR PROBLEMS?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	286	3.2	3.2	3.2
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	596	6.6	6.7	9.8
SOME EXTENT	3.	1861	20.6	20.8	30.6
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	3224	35.7	36.0	66.6
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	2994	33.2	33.4	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	58	0.6	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	5019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8961 MISSING CASES 58

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NNAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

Q19 MY SUPERVISOR MAKES IT EASY TO TELL HIM WHEN THINGS ARE NOT GOING AS WELL AS HE EXPECTS:

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	403	4.5	4.5	4.5
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	812	9.0	9.1	13.6
SOME EXTENT	3.	2093	23.2	23.4	37.0
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	3282	36.4	36.7	73.8
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	2344	26.0	26.2	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	85	0.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8934 MISSING CASES 85

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE Ncname (CREATION DATE = 12/C2/77)

Q2C TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR ENCOURAGE THE PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR HIM TO WORK AS A TEAM?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	512	5.7	5.7	5.7
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	919	10.2	10.3	16.0
SOME EXTENT	3.	2332	25.9	26.0	42.0
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	3033	33.6	33.9	75.9
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	2159	23.9	24.1	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	64	0.7	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8955 MISSING CASES 64

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE Ncname (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

Q21 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR ENCOURAGE THE PEOPLE WHO WORK FOR HIM TO EXCHANGE OPINIONS AND IDEAS?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	524	5.8	5.9	5.9
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	1251	13.9	14.0	19.8
SOME EXTENT	3.	2765	30.7	30.9	50.7
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	2829	31.4	31.6	82.3
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	1580	17.5	17.7	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	70	0.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8949 MISSING CASES 70

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NONAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

G22 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO GIVE THEIR BEST EFFORT?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	345	3.8	3.9	3.9
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	793	8.8	8.9	12.7
SOME EXTENT	3.	2165	24.0	24.2	37.0
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	3298	36.6	36.9	73.9
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	2335	25.9	26.1	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	83	0.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	5019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8936 MISSING CASES 83

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NNAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

C23 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR MAINTAIN HIGH PERSONAL STANDARDS OF PERFORMANCE?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	277	3.1	3.1	3.1
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	635	7.0	7.1	10.2
SOME EXTENT	3.	1905	21.1	21.3	31.5
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	3460	38.4	38.7	70.2
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	2662	29.5	29.8	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	80	0.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	5019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8929 MISSING CASES 80

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE Ncname (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

Q24 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR HELP YOU TO IMPROVE YOUR PERFORMANCE?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	784	8.7	8.8	8.8
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	1224	13.6	13.7	22.5
SOME EXTENT	3.	2783	30.9	31.2	53.6
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	2851	31.6	31.9	85.5
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	1292	14.3	14.5	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	85	0.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8934 MISSING CASES 85

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NNAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

C25 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR PROVIDE YOU WITH THE HELP
YOU NEED SO YOU CAN SCHEDULE WORK AHEAD OF TIME?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	888	9.8	10.0	10.0
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	1366	15.1	15.3	25.3
SOME EXTENT	3.	2749	30.5	30.9	56.2
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	2686	29.8	30.1	86.3
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	1220	13.5	13.7	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	110	1.2	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8909 MISSING CASES 110

PRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE Ncname (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

C26 TO WHAT EXTENT DOES YOUR SUPERVISOR OFFER NEW IDEAS FOR SOLVING
JOB RELATED PROBLEMS?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	575	6.4	6.4	6.4
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	1246	13.8	14.0	20.4
SOME EXTENT	3.	3075	34.1	34.5	54.9
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	2790	30.9	31.3	86.1
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	1238	13.7	13.9	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	95	1.1	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	9019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 8924 MISSING CASES 95

PRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NONAME (CREATION DATE = 12/C2/77)

C45 ALL IN ALL, HOW SATISFIED ARE YOU WITH YOUR SUPERVISOR?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
VERY DISSATISFIED	1.	627	7.0	7.0	7.0
SOMEWHAT DISSAT	2.	947	10.5	10.6	17.6
NEITHER SAT NOR DISS	3.	1110	12.3	12.4	30.0
FAIRLY SATISFIED	4.	2544	28.2	28.5	58.5
VERY SATISFIED	5.	2713	41.2	41.5	100.0
	9.	78	0.9	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	5019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES E941 MISSING CASES 78

HRM E-6 PERCEPTIONS

FILE NCNAME (CREATION DATE = 12/02/77)

Q58 TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THIS COMMAND TRAINED YOU TO ACCEPT INCREASED LEADERSHIP?

CATEGORY LABEL	CODE	ABSOLUTE FREQ	RELATIVE FREQ (PCT)	ADJUSTED FREQ (PCT)	CUM FREQ (PCT)
A VERY LITTLE EXTENT	1.	1058	11.7	15.0	15.0
A LITTLE EXTENT	2.	1278	14.2	18.1	33.1
SOME EXTENT	3.	2125	23.6	30.1	63.2
A GREAT EXTENT	4.	1715	19.0	24.3	87.5
A VERY GREAT EXTENT	5.	879	9.7	12.5	100.0
MISSING DATA	9.	1964	21.8	MISSING	100.0
	TOTAL	5019	100.0	100.0	

VALID CASES 7055 MISSING CASES 1964

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES ARMY SERGEANTS MAJOR ACADEMY

Curriculum

<u>CURRICULUM</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
A. Academic Subjects	
1. Core Curriculum	
Military Studies	110
World Studies	86
Leadership and Human Relations	176
Resource Management	128.5
Self-Paced Instruction	30
Contemporary Military Issues	25
Physical Training and Appearance Program	<u>54</u>
SUBTOTAL	609.5
2. Professional Development Program	<u>36</u>
SUBTOTAL	<u>36</u>
3. Electives	<u>90</u>
SUBTOTAL	<u>90</u>
ACADEMIC SUBTOTAL	<u>735.5</u>
B. Nonacademic Subjects	
Inprocessing	24
Outprocessing	8
Commandant's Time	46
Open Time	<u>66.5</u>
SUBTOTAL	<u>144.5</u>
TOTAL	<u>880</u>
C. Recapitulation	
1. Security Classification	
Confidential	0
Secret	0
Unclassified	<u>880</u>
TOTAL	<u>880</u>

SOURCE: Program of Instruction for US Army Sergeants Major Course, p. 4, Dept. of the Army, 1 Feb. 1977.

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE SENIOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

Curriculum

<u>CURRICULUM</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
AREA I: Communication Skills	<u>34</u>
AREA II: Environment	<u>44</u>
Phase 1 - The USAF and National Security Objectives	28
Phase 2 - The USAF Role in Force Application	16
AREA III: Management	<u>114</u>
Phase 1 - Individuals and the Work Environment	33
Phase 2 - Management of Human Resources	30
Phase 3 - Management Concepts and Techniques	51
ELECTIVES	<u>36</u>
EVALUATION	<u>9</u>
TOTAL ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION	<u>237</u>
OTHER SCHEDULED PERIODS: Administration, orientation, and ceremonies	20
Commandant's Option	12
Student Counseling	30
Independent Research	61
TOTAL - Other Than Academic Instruction	<u>123</u>
TOTAL CURRICULUM HOURS	<u><u>360</u></u>

SOURCE: Curriculum Circular, p. 7, Dept. of the Air Force,
August 1976.

APPENDIX F

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS STAFF NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICER ACADEMY

Curriculum

<u>CURRICULUM</u>	<u>HOURS</u>
1. Personnel and General Administration	17
2. Physical Training Management	26
3. Military Justice	8
4. Drill, Customs and Courtesies, and Inspections	26
5. Effective Communication	23
a. Effective Reading	
b. Effective Writing	
6. Logistics	4
7. Marine Corps Organization and Staff Functioning	9
8. Leadership	<u>58</u>
TOTAL	<u>171</u>
Testing and Evaluation	41
Administrative	<u>28</u>
TOTAL	<u>240</u>

SOURCE: Student Information For Staff NCO Academy, p. 6,
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
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